LBMA Trial Summaries Week3

‘Responsible gold’ on trial: Week 3 of the LBMA case

Weekly summaries from the LBMA trial

The CEO of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), Ruth Crowell, among others, took the witness stand this week at the novel High Court trial brought by Tanzanian claimants.

Former mine personnel from the North Mara gold mine, corporate accountability researchers and LBMA officials gave evidence about the mine’s security practices and the LBMA’s ‘Good Delivery’ accreditation decisions.

In case you missed it, the case has been brought by the families of two young Tanzanian men who allege their loved ones were unlawfully killed by police guarding the mine in 2019. They argue that failures in the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing system contributed to the deaths. The LBMA denies liability. Visit our week 1 and week 2 summaries.

Here is what happened in Week 3:

The court heard testimony from former mine security and investigations personnel about the close relationship between the mine’s operators and Tanzanian police, how violent incidents were handled, and the mine’s influence over police conduct. Among those giving evidence was Robert Duncan, a former British soldier who worked as a security expert at North Mara and testified on behalf of the claimants. Explaining why he had decided to come forward, Duncan told the court that he “knew that what had happened at the mine was wrong”.

Attention then turned to the LBMA’s internal decision-making. Former officials were questioned about their knowledge of allegations at North Mara, their reliance on auditor reports, and potential conflicts of interest within the responsible-sourcing system. Internal correspondence raised questions about how serious concerns were communicated, and why MMTC-PAMP – the India-based refiner sourcing gold from North Mara, part of the Swiss MKS PAMP group – continued to retain its Good Delivery accreditation.

Throughout the week, the evidence returned to a central question: when serious human rights concerns were raised, who was responsible for acting on them, and was there a conflict of interest with those who were setting the rules?

LBMA witnesses repeatedly emphasised their commitment to “continuous improvement”, alignment with OECD guidance, and reliance on independent auditors, arguing that their responsibilities did not extend to “auditing the auditors”. They maintained that these procedures demonstrated that the LBMA had fulfilled its responsible-sourcing obligations.

By contrast, counsel for the claimants, Dominic Grieve KC and Russell Hopkins, pressed witnesses on the gap between the LBMA’s policies and procedures and the reality of what was happening on the ground at North Mara.

From the mine to the market: security and certification under scrutiny

  • Who holds the police accountable? Former North Mara security officer Robert Duncan testified that incidents outside the mine perimeter were treated as “police incidents” rather than investigated by mine personnel. Describing the mine’s relationship with police as not being “a two-way thing”, he suggested that the mine could have exercised greater influence over police conduct. While the defence emphasised that Tanzanian police operated independently, Mr Duncan’s testimony pointed to a close relationship between the mine and the police, raising questions about the mine’s responsibility for addressing abuses.
  • A shooting described as “a homicide”: Alexander Hughes, a retired British police officer who worked as a mine investigator at North Mara, described an incident in which a man was shot in the back while fleeing from police. Mr Hughes characterised the shooting as “a homicide”. He also suggested the mine could have exercised greater influence over police conduct through financial incentives and police deployment arrangements under its Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with police. The defence challenged his recollection and the extent of his firsthand knowledge of the incident.
  • How much do downstream buyers rely on LBMA certification? The defence emphasised that companies such as Apple conducted their own due diligence, while researcher Kendyl Ruth Salcito maintained that certification remained a key screening tool for buyers. Correspondence presented in court revealed Apple had raised concerns about problems with accredited refiners that “continue to reappear”. In one case, Apple excluded the refinery of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas over child labour concerns and questioned why it remained LBMA-accredited. The LBMA subsequently reviewed the matter but kept the accreditation in place. The claimants pointed to these exchanges as evidence that major buyers looked to LBMA for assurance on refiners.

Who knew about North Mara, and when?

“Nobody seems to be aware that there was a mine owned by a multinational company attracting high-level litigation.” – Dominic Grieve KC

  • “Never heard of North Mara”: Former LBMA Chair Paul Fisher, CEO Ruth Crowell and responsible-sourcing executive Sakhila Mirza said they were unaware of human rights allegations at North Mara before 2019, despite years of public reporting, RAID investigations, and scrutiny by Tanzania’s parliament. Grieve questioned how the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing system could identify mine-level risks when such widely documented allegations had apparently escaped the attention of senior officials.
  • RAID’s warnings reached the Physical Committee: Correspondence revealed in court showed that RAID’s allegations about human rights abuses at North Mara, including calls to suspend MMTC-PAMP, had been brought to the LBMA’s Physical Committee, which included representatives of major bullion banks. Fisher acknowledged the committee was kept informed but maintained it had no decision-making authority over responsible sourcing. LBMA witnesses defended their reliance on independent auditors, arguing they had no responsibility to “audit the auditors”. This raised questions about who was ultimately responsible for ensuring serious external warnings were evaluated and acted upon.

Independent assurance: who scrutinises the auditors?

  • Recertification without a key report: MMTC-PAMP was recertified in July 2019 without the LBMA obtaining its auditor’s 2018 management report. Mirza accepted the report was required but said the rule “wasn’t enforced”; Crowell confirmed this rule was not consistently applied until 2020.
  • “But this was an IRP”: In 2019, the LBMA opened an Incident Review Process (IRP), an internal investigation into allegations concerning MMTC-PAMP’s sourcing from North Mara. The LBMA relied on the auditor’s positive assurance without requesting an underlying memorandum detailing how risks associated with North Mara had been assessed. Crowell explained the LBMA did not normally receive such documents. When Grieve challenged her, pointing out, “But this was an IRP,” she replied, “Yes it was.” She also acknowledged that the review went ahead without the risk mitigation plan required under the LBMA’s own rules.
  • What did the site visit reveal? MMTC-PAMP’s report on its visit to North Mara recorded community disputes, protests and a police presence, yet identified dust from operations as “the only potential negative impact”. The LBMA did not examine the report during its review. Crowell said this fell outside its usual scope.
  • Restrictions on Synergy: An external consultancy called Synergy was commissioned to assess human rights risks and conditions at North Mara as part of efforts to scrutinise the refiner’s sourcing practices. The claimants examined correspondence suggesting that Barrick, the mine’s operator, restricted aspects of Synergy’s work, raising questions about the independence and reliability of its findings. LBMA witnesses maintained that the restrictions were not material.

Industry influence and potential conflicts of interest

  • Who wrote the rules? Jacqueline Mayor Meylan of MKS PAMP, the parent company of the Indian gold refiner, helped draft the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing guidance, including provisions allowing refiners to rely on alternative certification schemes that did not require mine visits. In 2017, she proposed replacing mandatory suspension after six months with wording that the LBMA “should consider” suspending. Grieve questioned whether this weakened the rules. Fisher denied MKS PAMP held a “privileged” position, while Crowell defended the change as consistent with OECD guidance.
  • Conflicts of interest: The claimants questioned overlapping roles within LBMA: Andrew Quinn sat on both LBMA’s and Barrick’s boards; Mehdi Barkhordar chaired MMTC-PAMP while serving on LBMA’s board. These connections raised questions about industry influence over the standards and oversight of companies subject to them. Fisher acknowledged there was “always a potential conflict of interest” but denied improper influence.

How much power does Good Delivery accreditation carry?

  • A valuable status: Good Delivery accreditation provides access to the lucrative London gold market. Fisher acknowledged its commercial and reputational value but stressed that responsible sourcing involves “continuous improvement”, not guarantees.
  • The cost of losing it: Former LBMA committee member Sunil Kashyap accepted that losing LBMA GDL accreditation would trigger reviews by market makers, the banks trading gold in London.

GDL accreditation continued despite serious warnings

  • What the rules required: Mirza accepted that, if allegations of serious abuses at North Mara from 2014 onwards were substantiated, OECD guidance could require immediate suspension or disengagement from the source, or, depending on the risks involved, a mitigation plan subject to review within six months. She maintained, however, that identifying failures in the refiner’s due diligence was the auditor’s responsibility.
  • Warnings to the Membership Committee: In December 2020, a committee member asked whether MMTC-PAMP had stopped sourcing from Barrick in Tanzania and was told Barrick had “tidied up issues” there “for now”. Kashyap said he understood this to concern pollution, not human rights.
  • RAID’s warnings: In 2020, about six months after the second young man was allegedly shot dead by police, RAID called on the LBMA to suspend MMTC-PAMP’s accreditation, citing ongoing violence and concerns about the independence of Synergy’s assessment. The LBMA rejected the request, pointing to its review process. In 2022, an LBMA Compliance Panel considered further allegations from RAID concerning excessive force and deaths at North Mara. Grieve challenged Crowell on the evidence before the panel, putting it to her that RAID had been “right” about the serious abuses. Crowell acknowledged that North Mara was high-risk but described it as being on “that line in between” high-risk sourcing and a zero-tolerance breach.
  • “A nuanced decision”: When asked whether she had approved continued accreditation because she was satisfied, Crowell replied: “It’s a nuanced decision.” She maintained that LBMA relied on independent assurance and ongoing engagement with refiners to address risks, rather than automatically excluding them.

What this illuminates

The third week exposed a troubling gap between the violence alleged at North Mara and the decisions being made in London’s gold market. Mine operators, refiners, auditors and the LBMA each pointed to the limits of its responsibilities. Yet the central question remained: who was ultimately accountable for ensuring that serious warnings led to action?

Perhaps most revealing was the LBMA’s apparent distinction between high-risk sourcing and a breach requiring zero tolerance. Crowell described North Mara as falling on “that line in between”. But where exactly is that line drawn? And if years of allegations of killings and serious human rights abuses did not warrant suspension, what would?

The trial continues at the High Court in London. The allegations and questions of liability remain contested.

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