Gold Jewellery_LBMA Trial_Weekly Summaries

‘Responsible gold’ on trial: Week 4 of the LBMA case

Weekly summaries from the LBMA trial

Week four of the landmark High Court trial scrutinised the reliability of gold industry audits, the commercial influence of LBMA accreditation, and how consumer-facing companies respond to allegations of serious human rights abuses.

The trial against the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) continued this week, with former industry executives and responsible-sourcing experts giving evidence about the oversight of gold refiners and allegations of violence at Tanzania’s North Mara gold mine.

The case has been brought by the families of two young Tanzanian men who allege their loved ones were unlawfully killed by police guarding the mine in 2019. They argue that failures in the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing system contributed to the deaths. The LBMA denies liability. Find all of our weekly updates here.

Here is what happened in Week 4:

Internal LBMA correspondence revealed concerns about the quality of audits, departures from established accreditation procedures and the influence exercised by senior figures in the gold industry. Witnesses acknowledged the considerable commercial power of LBMA accreditation, but maintained that responsibility for sourcing decisions and human rights due diligence rested primarily with refiners and other supply chain actors.

Did the LBMA have the power to stop sourcing from North Mara?

  • The commercial value of accreditation: Mehdi Barkhordar, former Chair of the Indian gold refiner MMTC-PAMP (part of the Swiss MKS PAMP group), and former LBMA board member, was on the witness stand. He acknowledged that Good Delivery accreditation, which gives refiners access to the London gold market, was “absolutely essential” to MMTC-PAMP. The claimants argue that the LBMA could have used this commercial leverage to press MMTC-PAMP to stop sourcing tainted gold from North Mara. Internal correspondence revealed that the gold refiner was prepared to comply if the LBMA required it to disengage. Barkhordar accepted that the LBMA could act if its rules were breached, and that MMTC-PAMP had some leverage over Barrick, although he could not quantify how much. He also said he “wished” the social auditors, Synergy, had recommended to stop sourcing from North Mara, but maintained that their recommendation had been to continue sourcing.
  • The limits of that influence: Andrew Quinn, a former independent non-executive director of the LBMA, who also served on Barrick’s board, acknowledged that losing MMTC-PAMP as a buyer would have been a serious matter for Barrick. However, he maintained that Barrick could readily find other buyers for its gold. He disputed the claim from Barrick’s CEO Mark Bristow that ending sales to MMTC-PAMP would devastate Tanzania’s mining industry, and disputed expert evidence that banks would be reluctant to trade gold outside the LBMA’s Good Delivery system.
  • Could the LBMA act beyond audit findings? The LBMA’s Chief Technical Officer Neil Harby accepted that certification was “much more than a rubber stamp” and that the LBMA could scrutinise audits, require further checks and delay certification. Yet Andrew Quinn maintained that the LBMA could not require MMTC-PAMP to stop sourcing from North Mara unless an audit had failed. The claimants challenged this position, citing internal correspondence in which Quinn himself had expressed concern about another accredited refiner despite its clean audit. The exchanges raised questions about whether favourable audit findings genuinely limited the LBMA’s ability to investigate concerns and take action.
  • Responsibility at senior levels: Barkhordar acknowledged knowing that North Mara supplied MMTC-PAMP and was considered high risk, but maintained that compliance was “not my job”.

What did the audits actually show?

  • Warnings about weak oversight: Harby was questioned about an OECD assessment which found that supplier declarations went “largely unchallenged” during audits and that the LBMA tended towards lenience with gold refiners.
  • An apparent change in audit assurance: Harby acknowledged that MMTC-PAMP’s reports lacked detail but maintained that they met the LBMA’s requirements. Its 2016 management report appeared to replace “reasonable assurance” with the lower standard of “limited assurance”. Harby agreed such a change would be “shocking” and accepted that the wording appeared to have been altered.
  • Missing and destroyed reports: The LBMA’s published guidance required accredited refiners to submit annual management reports, yet MMTC-PAMP’s 2017 and 2018 reports were never submitted. The 2017 report was reportedly destroyed, despite a ten-year retention requirement; Barkhordar said he had “no idea” why. Harby accepted that anyone reading the LBMA’s published guidance would reasonably have assumed these reports were being submitted. Barkhordar, who signed such reports, said he relied on the competence of compliance staff and had only skimmed them. Harby maintained that the rules were applied without preferential treatment, while the defence said the requirement to disclose management reports was not enforced until 2020.
  • Reliance on certification: Mike Loch, a former Motorola Solutions supply chain executive, described LBMA certification as only “a datapoint” in due diligence. Yet he acknowledged that Motorola did not routinely examine audit reports for compliant refiners unless concerns arose, and recognised LBMA accreditation as one of the industry’s most established certifications. The judge intervened to say that Motorola’s practices were not necessarily representative of other companies.

Industry influence within the LBMA

  • Influence over decisions: Internal emails showed Barkhordar pressing officials to approve MMTC-PAMP’s preferred auditor. Correspondence suggested an exception could be made even if it upset a rival refiner, and MMTC-PAMP was accredited on a single quarter’s audit rather than a full year. In 2019, when Barrick delayed Synergy’s access to North Mara, Barkhordar asked Quinn to raise the issue with Barrick’s chief executive, Mark Bristow.
  • Influence within the association: In private messages, LBMA staff acknowledged the weight Barkhordar’s name carried, with one remarking that once his name was mentioned, she “had to take it seriously”. Senior figures raised concerns about his conduct and his objectivity towards competing refiners, yet he was later co-opted back onto the board.

What constitutes serious human rights abuse?

  • A high threshold under OECD guidance: Mora Johnson, a lawyer involved in developing the OECD’s Gold Supplement, said that Annex II was “intended to be a very, very high threshold for automatic disengagement”. She stressed the importance of establishing the circumstances surrounding alleged killings, including whether deaths occurred accidentally or through the use of force in self-defence. She did agree that killings not justified by self-defence would generally constitute serious human rights abuses. She also accepted that an abuse did not have to involve torture or degrading treatment to meet that threshold.
  • A dispute about what the evidence means: The judge observed that there was “not a lot of dispute of primary fact, mainly dispute of inference”. His interventions highlighted the importance of how the court interprets the evidence, including the circumstances in which alleged violence should trigger obligations under international responsible-sourcing standards.

The week’s proceedings ended earlier than scheduled, following a last-minute change to the court timetable. No hearing took place on Thursday, 29 October.

What this illuminates

This week’s evidence raised fundamental questions about the relationship between commercial power and responsibility. While the LBMA’s accreditation system gives it considerable influence over the gold trade, witnesses disputed how far that influence translated into an obligation to act on human rights concerns.

Senior industry figures acknowledged the essential commercial importance of Good Delivery status, but sought to place responsibility for sourcing audits and responses to human rights risks to others, and not to them. Meanwhile, internal documents revealed gaps in reporting, departures from established procedures, and assurances that were not always backed up by detailed verification.

The evidence also raised questions about how responsible-sourcing standards should operate when serious human rights allegations remain contested. While the OECD framework requires companies to identify and respond to risks, the witnesses differed over what information was needed to justify stronger action, and who had the authority to take it.

For the families of the two young Tanzanian men killed at North Mara, and the additional 30 claimants whose cases are stayed, these questions are far from theoretical. At the heart of the case is whether a certification system designed to identify and address serious human rights risks failed to respond when confronted with clear warnings about such abuse.

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