Witness testimony puts alleged killings at the North Mara gold mine under scrutiny at the LBMA trial, and examines civil society investigations and responsible-sourcing safeguards
The landmark High Court trial against the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) continued this week, with Tanzanian witnesses and responsible-sourcing experts giving evidence about alleged abuses at the North Mara gold mine and the effectiveness of the gold industry’s due diligence.
In case you missed week one, the case has been brought by the families of two young Tanzanian men who allege their loved ones were unlawfully killed by police guarding the mine in 2019. They argue that failures in the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing system contributed to the deaths. The LBMA denies liability.
Here is what happened in Week 2:
The families who brought the case to London gave testimony remotely via an online link, presenting their evidence on the facts of the case. Both men were 23 years old when they lost their lives in separate incidents at the North Mara mine in July and December 2019. In court, their relatives described how they learned of the deaths and their efforts to establish what had happened. While much of the trial focused on standards, audits and accreditation, their testimony was a reminder of what is at stake – the lives of two young men and the families still seeking answers and accountability.
The LBMA’s lawyers questioned the families’ accounts against earlier interviews and missing records. Witnesses explained why such records are hard to obtain when police are the alleged perpetrators.
The role of the LBMA, and which brands have relied on the LBMA’s responsible-sourcing accreditation, were among this week’s themes. The witnesses repeatedly drew a gap between the LBMA’s written guidance and how it was implemented and enforced.
Tanzanian witnesses questioned over alleged killings
- Credibility of witnesses: The LBMA’s lawyers compared the witnesses’ sworn statements with earlier interviews given to MiningWatch Canada and RAID, pressing them on timings, phone calls, and where they last saw the two men. The witnesses stood by their accounts.
- Lack of official evidence: The defence highlighted missing medical and post-mortem records. One relative said police had taken a post-mortem report, while another recounted that a doctor had privately suggested the nature of death was “different” but feared speaking openly, raising concerns about barriers to evidence and justice.
- Disputed causes of death: Counsel questioned whether the deaths resulted from police violence or accidents involving being in a dangerous environment, including a possible fall from a mine wall.
- “Trespassers” or victims of excessive force? The defence emphasised unlawful entry, alleged gold theft and risks associated with trespassing. The exchanges raised questions about whether security forces were responding to genuine threats or using disproportionate force against people seeking livelihoods in communities affected by large-scale industrial gold mining.
The OECD framework: who is responsible?
- Following international standards: The LBMA argued that its Responsible Gold Guidance (RGG) implements the OECD’s due-diligence framework, which aims to address human rights risks but cannot “guarantee” their elimination. The defence suggested that eliminating abuses ultimately requires “intergovernmental” action and cannot be achieved by the private sector alone. Claimants’ witness stressed that companies also “have a role”, adding that research had identified shortcomings in how the framework operated “in practice”.
- Downstream companies retain responsibility: The LBMA emphasised that OECD guidance requires companies to conduct their own due diligence, even when participating in industry certification schemes. SOMO’s Advocacy Director Joseph Wilde-Ramsing agreed but warned that companies often treat certification as evidence that they have fulfilled their responsibilities. Such schemes, he said, should be “a piece of the puzzle, not a proxy” for independent checks.
- Standards on paper versus practice: An OECD assessment found the LBMA’s written guidance was 100% aligned with OECD standards by version 7. Wilde-Ramsing stressed that due diligence should be judged by its real-world impact, arguing that it is not merely an “obligation of means” but an “obligation of result” – meaning that having appropriate procedures is not enough without achieving meaningful outcomes.
Does the LBMA’s oversight work?
- Stricter rules or effective controls? The LBMA emphasised successive, incremental improvements to its RGG. When the defendant’s counsel described controls becoming “tighter, tighter, tighter,” witness Christoph Wiedmer responded that the question was whether they were “good”.
- Who oversees the independent auditors? The LBMA maintained sourcing decisions are commercial decisions for refiners. Wiedmer accepted this, but argued that, as the acclaimed authority overseeing the accreditation scheme, the LBMA “must guarantee” the auditors do their job effectively.
- The LBMA’s market influence: The defence suggested that overly strict requirements could push gold into less regulated markets. Wiedmer acknowledged this risk, but pointed to the LBMA’s substantial market coverage (85-90%), arguing that its Good Delivery accreditation gave it significant commercial leverage.
Why was the LBMA not approached earlier?
- The LBMA’s responsibility: The defence repeatedly questioned why Tanzanian witnesses and civil society organisations had initially directed concerns about North Mara to other institutions rather than the LBMA, suggesting this reflected the limits of its responsibility. Expert witnesses explained that the LBMA’s role and influence in the gold supply chain had only become more apparent over time.
- Gold buyers looking to the LBMA’s accreditation: The defence used correspondence with Apple to demonstrate that the company conducted its own due diligence. However, further emails introduced by the claimants showed Apple seeking assurances from the LBMA about conflict-free gold, and the LBMA challenging concerns Apple raised about a refiner. The exchanges are relevant to the claimants’ argument that LBMA accreditation could discourage independent scrutiny of human rights risks.
What this illuminates
The testimony this week revealed how the understanding of responsibility is divided across the gold supply chain: refiners making sourcing decisions, independent auditors assessing compliance, certification bodies overseeing the responsible-sourcing scheme, and downstream buyers conducting their own due diligence. Each actor can point to its own procedures and the limits of its responsibilities.
Yet the claimants question how gold linked to a mine with years of reported human rights abuses continued to pass through a system designed to identify and address precisely those risks.
In this “see nothing, know nothing, hear nothing” menagerie of responsible sourcing, it is unclear who, exactly, is assuming responsibility?

